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WILLIAM J. GOLDWORN *
The problems of unemployment and retirement have been
thrust into sharp focus by President Lyndon B. Johnson's State
of the Union address in which the President called for an uncon-
ditional war on poverty. This stress on poverty in our time is
paradoxical: although there are many people with inadequate
incomes, there is a smaller percentage of such people now than at
any time in the past. The problem of the inadequate income
group has been analyzed during the past years from many per-
spectives.1 An estimated twenty per cent of the population falls
within this classification, which is not limited to outright poverty
in all instances.2 No matter what its scope, this group is the sub-
ject of growing concern.
Two principal questions to be answered are: who are the indi-
viduals in this inadequate income group and why are they part of
it? The group composition is forty per cent over age sixty-five;
thirty-three per cent women living alone or as heads of families;
twenty per cent non-whites; and a miscellaneous group including, for
example, the physically disabled. Four major individual disabilities
which lead to inclusion in the inadequate income group are: poor
education; physical or mental deficiency; restricted job opportu-
nities due to race; and location in the wrong geographical area.
People with inadequate incomes are far from a homogeneous group
and inclusion within the group is dependent on many factors, but
the characteristic which appears to be present in most cases is
lack of education.
Progress in the fight against inadequate income has been
achieved to a degree by the economic growth of the nation, and by
public and private measures which serve to redistribute income.
For example, since 1950, beneficiaries of private pension and de-
* of the Florida bar, Lecturer, School of Law, University of Miami.
1 Galbraith, The Affluent Society (1958); Morgan, David, Cohen & Brazer,
Income and Welfare in the United States (1962).
2 A survey appearing in the February 17, 1964, issue of Newsweek Magazine
at page 19 indicates that most of this group have so-called luxury items such as
new cars, television sets, and electric appliances.
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ferred profit sharing plans have increased fourfold and their bene-
fits have increased sixfold; the number of social security recipients
has risen sixfold and their benefits sixteenfold. The institution
of unemployment compensation and other fringe benefits have also
played a part in the general progress.3 An offsetting factor which
stimulates governmental and individual concern is the rapid in-
crease of the population over age sixty-five. It is with the provision
of adequate income for this group that this paper will be concerned.
BACKGROUND
With the industrial revolution and the resulting highly indus-
trialized economy of the United States, it became evident that a
primary need of the individual, beyond that of current subsistence,
was that of financial security in old age. Rapid advances made by
the medical profession increased life expectancy by astounding
jumps. It became incumbent upon the individual to earn enough
during his productive years to support himself and his family, and
to save enough to carry him through the non-productive years
which would follow.
Our forefathers sought to achieve some measure of post-
retirement financial security through individual investment and
savings, or through continued operation of their businesses, either
directly or through family efforts. Progressive taxation of current
income created unforeseen difficulties for such simple programs. The
introduction of life insurance and annuities produced an artificial
mode of estate creation and was an early attempt by progressive
individuals to solve the problem of inadequate post-retirement in-
come. It was this early realization that group action provided a
means of accomplishing what the individual was unable to do alone
that laid the predicate for later mass coverage and group savings
programs. Insurance, however, was not the answer for the great
majority of individuals, and business men as early as 1875 turned
to the concept of a private pension plan to provide post-retirement
income.
With the limitations on direct wage increases enforced by
wage stabilization policies during World War II, workers became
more interested in indirect benefits. Employers, encumbered by
high corporate and excess profits taxes, sought means of reducing
their tax burden while limiting the mobility of their skilled work
force and attracting scarce employees of executive caliber.
The Internal Revenue Code of 1942 contained provisions which
made the employer's contribution to pension plans a deductible
3 The Chase Manhattan Bank, Business in Brief, Jan.-Feb. 1964.
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business expense.4 This addition to the Code increased the attrac-
tiveness of income deferral provisions to employers, just as high
personal income taxes had increased the attractiveness of those
provisions to high salaried personnel. Thus the fact that deferral
provisions produced a welcome degree of income averaging for the
employee and an equally welcome deduction for the employer
tended greatly to enhance the desirability of pension plans.
Interest in pension programs was further increased by the
position of the National Labor Relations Board and the Inland
Steel decision of 1948. The position taken by the Supreme Court
the following year, that a pension plan was a bargainable issue,
acted as a springboard for the rapid expansion of private pension
programs into the mass employee area.5
Notwithstanding the interest in the private area, employee
coverage by private plans was so small during the early years of
the development of these programs that the government found
itself propelled into a broad social program: Social Security and
survivor benefits became an integral part of the fiscal policy of
the worker after 1930, as had railroad retirement programs, veter-
ans' pensions and public assistance programs before. The basic
desire of the individual for independence and avoidance of the
stigma of government aid led to increasing pressures for private
programs rather than to strenuous implementation of governmental
programs.
The information available from the monthly labor reviews
issued by the Department of Labor indicates that within a civilian
labor force of over sixty-eight million in 1958 there was an appar-
ent maximum potential pension coverage of approximately forty-
two million workers, of whom only nineteen million were covered
by plans. This is only twenty-seven per cent of those eligible.6 The
coverage had increased in 1961 to over twenty-two million, but the
total labor force had increased as well.
In a period of gradually expanding coverage, many of those
workers not covered had been effectively precluded by their
employers' financial condition; others were not covered because
they were self-employed or unemployed. This created an unde-
4 Int. Rev. Code of 1942, § 162A. This section is the forerunner of Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 401.
5 Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 960 (1949). Profit sharing plans were later covered by the decision in Black-
Clawson Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 928, 210 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1953).
6 Holland, "Some Characteristics of Private Pension Plans," in 2 Staff of House
Comm. on Ways and Means, Tax Revision Compendium 1301, 1306, table 3 (Comm.
Print. 1959).
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sirable situation. Pressure for tax equalization led to the passage
of the so-called Keogh legislation.7
It is upon this tableau of pressures and problems that is
impressed the pattern of present change described herein. This
change is not without critics: Robert Tilove has indicated that
pension programs represent an inherent danger to our society in
their limitation on the mobility of labor and their concentration of
economic power.8 Such comments are not without merit at a time
when the misuse of pension funds has resulted in legislation to
review the operation and control of labor union funds ' and exten-
sion of the Internal Revenue Code to control use of funds and limit
discriminatory practices.10
CURRENT TRENDS
In observing the trends in employee benefit plans, the areas
which merit the greatest comment are the modes of funding plans,
the coverage of employees and the effect of the plans on employee
mobility. Each of these areas will be given separate consideration.
Modes of Funding
Funding is the process of accumulating funds necessary to
pay retirement benefits when due. Reserves are maintained
through insurance of one form or another, investment in corporate
securities, or other non-insured funds or capital investments. The
growth and dimension of these funds are staggering. Table I indi-
cates the assets of private funds over a period of years. These
figures do not consider the government accumulations in the Social
Security and Survivor Benefit programs.
TABLE I
Book value end of the year (billions of dollars)
Insured pension 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962
reserves ............. 14.1 15.6 17.6 18.8 20.2 21.6
Non-insured corporate
pension funds ........ 19.3 22.1 25.3 28.7 32.4 36.0
Other non-insured
funds (union
administered, non
profit, etc.) .......... 1.5 1.8 2.0 2.3 2.7 3.0
TOTAL ............. 34.9 39.5 44.9 49.9 55.3 60.7
Source: Securities & Exchange Commission Statistical Service Series, Release
No. 1902, May 24th, 1963.
7 Self-Employed Individuals Retirement Act of 1962, 76 Stat. 809 (1962), amend-
ing Int. Rev. Code of 1954.
8 Tilove, Pension Funds and Economic Freedom (1959).
9 Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, 72 Stat. 997 (1958), as amended
by 76 Stat. 35 (1962), 29 U.S.C. §§ 301-309.
10 As the trust is to be administered for the exclusive benefit of the employees
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There appears to be a progressive and steady growth of all
forms of plans, with the largest portion of funds being retained in
the non-insured corporate pension funds. The greater portion of
the receipts have been invested in corporate securities, government
bonds, mortgages, and common stocks. Table II indicates the
distribution of the assets of these corporate pension funds.
Table II
Assets of Corporate Pension Funds (willions of dollars)
Book Value, End of Year
1957 1958 1959 196o 1961 x962
Cash & Deposits ..... 368 383 407 418 485 513
U. S. Gov't.
Securities ......... 2,032 1,985 2,148 2,034 2,064 2,215
Corp. Bonds
Own Company .... 641 638 674 736 755 853
Other Companies... 9,751 11,094 12,124 13,403 14,366 15,213
Preferred Stocks ..... 611 655 657 652 633 613
Common Stock
Own Company .... 584 646 773 874 1,025 1,167
Other Companies... 4,187 5,396 6,940 8,638 10,774 12,752
Mortgages .......... 313 405 576 753 907 1,140
Other Assets ........ 833 892 1,008 1,197 1,359 1,533
TOTAL ASSETS ... 19,319 22,094 25,307 28,706 32,368 35,999
Source: Securities & Exchange Commission Statistical Service Series, Release
No. 1902, May 24th, 1963.
The distribution of the resources of the pension funds set out in
Table II indicates the reinvestment of the reserves in industry,
with the possible purpose of continuing some measure of control
of the source of the funds. This type of investment is sensible and
desirable because it places the funds of the beneficiaries at work to
build the source of the contributions.
Even in those plans which are funded to a substantial degree
by insurance, the form of funding has changed substantially. Until
1930, most insured group retirement plans were funded under the
group annuity method. The increased desire for flexibility in recent
years has resulted in a trend toward deposit administration fund-
ing. This trend has been accelerated because of the adaptability of
under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a), use of company stock in the funding of the
trust or purchase of company stock with funds of the trust may be scrutinized and
penalties may be imposed if the transactions are not properly handled. See Casey,
"Using Company Stock in Employee Plans," N.Y.U. 14th Inst. on Fed. Tax 1301
(1957).
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this method of funding to the negotiated type of plan. Since 1958
six out of every ten plans have been of this type."
Many of the negotiated plans are funded by investments made
through the trustees of the plans and little is presently known of
the distribution of the assets of these funds. The recent legisla-
tion 12 requiring the presentation of information concerning the
funds may permit some light to be thrown on the subject. A cer-
tain degree of notoriety has been achieved by the Teamsters Union's
investment program which might be an indicator of the interest of
unions in mortgage financing, but this is too narrow a source of
information to be acceptable in drawing conclusions.
Coverage of Employees
Generally speaking, eligibility of the employee to participate in
a deferred compensation plan is determined by the class in which
the employee may be categorized. The Internal Revenue Code of
1954, as did its predecessor, permits a certain degree of discrimina-
tion in classifying employees. The plan may, for example, cover
salaried employees, workers paid an hourly wage, union members,
or employees with earnings in excess of 4,800 dollars per year.13
The method of classification chosen will not be disturbed provided
it is uniform and does not discriminate in favor of the company's
officers, stockholders, key personnel (supervisors and other highly
paid employees), or any others who might fall into the so-called
"prohibited group." 14
GROWTH OF COVERAGE
A review of the growth of coverage in plans indicates that the
number of workers participating in pension plans has increased
radically in a relatively short space of time. The characteristics
of the plans vary, about one-quarter being insurance company
trusteed plans, and the remaining three-quarters being divided
between single employer plans and the multi-employer plans. The
latter type of plan is designed to cover workers of all employers in
a particular industry, and generally in a specific geographical area.
Table III indicates the degree of coverage growth over the past
twelve years.
11 Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, Facts and Trends in Insured
Pension Plans From An Analysis of 900 Group Plans (1962).
12 See note 9, supra.
13 This figure is the present maximum sum of earnings upon which contributions
to Social Security are made.
14 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a) (4) ; the term "prohibited group" is used in
Gordon, "Qualifying a Pension or Profit Sharing Plan Under I.R.C.," in Taxation of
Deferred Employee and Executive Compensation 125, 126 (Sellin ed. 1960).
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TABLE III
Private Pension & Deferred Profit Sharing Plans
a
Estimated Coverage, end of year, (in thousands) b
Year Total Insured Non-Insured
1950 .......... 9,800 2,600 7,200
1951 .......... 11,000 2,900 8,100
1952 .......... 11,700 3,200 8,500
1953 .......... 13,200 3,400 9,800
1954 .......... 14,200 3,600 10,600
1955 .......... 15,400 3,800 11,600
1956 .......... 16,800 4,000 12,800
1957 .......... 18,200 4,400 13,800
1958 .......... 19,000 4,500 14,500
1959 .......... 20,200 4,800 15,400
1960 .......... 21,600 4,900 16,700
1961 .......... 22,600 5,100 17,500
a Includes pay-as-you-go, multi-employer, and union administered plans, those
of nonprofit organizations and railroad plans supplementing the Federal Railroad
retirement program. Insured plans are underwritten by insurance companies; non-
insured plans are in general funded through trustees.
b Excludes annuitants.
Source: Social Security Administration, Division of the Actuary.
Despite the apparent rapid growth of coverage, only a minority
of the labor force is covered by private pension plans. The figures
in the tables are slightly misleading when used as a basis of com-
parison because the labor force shown to be covered does not
include government workers, railroad employees (other than those
with supplemental plans) or others who may be covered by other
forms of plans. The total labor force in 1958 consisted of 68,647,000
of which only 19,000,000 were covered by plans.:" This total labor
force included unemployed and agricultural laborers, as well as
the self-employed. A reappraisal of the figures would then indicate
that about forty-five per cent of those who could conceivably be
covered by private pension plans are so covered. If the trend in
growth of coverage continues, a greater percentage may eventually
be covered. However, there is an inherent difficulty in predicting
effective coverage expansion due to the changing pattern of the
labor force and its steady numerical growth.
Coverage provisions may act as a limiting factor on the parti-
cipation of employees in the plans. This limitation is accomplished
by vesting provisions or benefit formulas and is influenced mark-
edly by retirement policy. The plans will often place qualifications
for participation in the form of attainment of a certain age or the
15 These figures are extracted from Table 3 in Holland, op. cit. supra note 6.
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completion of a number of years of service, or both, e.g. age thirty
and three years of service. Many of the plans have a maximum age
limit included in the eligibility requirements excluding workers
aged sixty or sixty-five, or older.16 Further limitation in the require-
ment of minimum terms of participation prior to retirement is quite
common. A survey of 900 group plans has indicated that the preva-
lent elgibility requirement in the deposit administration plan 17 is ten
years of service at retirement, with a recent growth in the use of
a fifteen year service requirement.'8
BENEFIT FORMULAS
Retirement benefits are usually based upon a formula which
recognizes one or both of two prime factors, length of service and
earnings. Generally speaking, if both are recognized in the plan
the formula is one of the "fixed benefit" type, e.g., one per cent of
earnings for each year of service. Where there is no recognition of
earnings, the formula is known as a "flat benefit" plan, e.g., two
dollars a month for each year of service. The latter is the type most
commonly used in the majority of union negotiated plans, with the
additional limitation of a maximum number of years of service
creditable to the pension.
Occasionally a plan will present no definite formula for the
determination of a pension, but instead will specify a percentage
of annual salary which will be used to purchase such an annuity
as the contribution permits. This type of plan is known as a
"money purchase plan" and is commonly used in insured profit
sharing plans. Where the company desires to cover salaried and
hourly employees under one plan, it is common to combine the
fiat and fixed benefit formulas. The flat benefit portion provides
benefits on earnings in excess of the social security benefits.
There appears to be a trend toward combination plans, with
money purchase plans steadily declining in favor. A review of the
plans most commonly used indicates that the fixed benefit type
is used in a majority of cases, as the trend is for closer integration
with social security benefits.
16 Such limitations are not destructive of qualification of a plan provided they
are not intended to discriminate.
17 Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, op. cit. supra note 1. Deposit
administration indicates a type of plan under which contributions are accumulated
in a fund at interest until an employee retires, at which time a lifetime annuity is
purchased by withdrawing the necessary premium from the fund.
18 Rice & Schlaudt, Basic Pension and Profit Sharing Plans 13 (1957); see
also Strecker, "Taxation of Retirement Provision," 27 Law & Contemp. Prob.
67 (1962).
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An examination of the integrated plans indicates that plans
of this type favor the highly paid employees. The Internal Reve-
nue Service has indicated that integrated plans will not be con-
sidered discriminatory provided that the benefits received with
respect to earnings above the social security ceiling shall not be
proportionately greater than the social security benefits them-
selves.'" Thus many small companies can obtain significant benefits
for their officers without fear of disqualification of the plan as
discriminatory. This appears to be incongruous in view of the
provisions of the code,20 where the distinct intent is expressed to
avoid discrimination in favor of officers, shareholders, supervisory
personnel, or other highly compensated personnel. A wide variation
is accomplished through integration, and the rationale used is that
there is a "uniform relationship" between the compensation and the
benefits so as to avoid discrimination even though benefits to the
highly paid employees are greater. The coverage is narrow at
times, for example, in a plan limited to salaried employees of a
company having a few salaried executives and several hundred
workers all of whom are on hourly wages. 21 It would appear that
any integration would be discriminatory in practice when the usual
wage scale is considered.
Plans requiring employee contributions have not been of much
importance. There would be no prohibition against such a plan
unless the manner of establishment of the plan or the rate of re-
quired contribution was so excessive as to be presumed to intend
to discriminate against lower paid employees.22 Contributions,
where required, are usually a fixed percentage of earnings. In the
flat benefit plans the rate may be an expressed amount. The con-
tributing employee is usually guaranteed the return of his contribu-
tion together with interest in cash at termination of employment,
or as a death benefit if he should die before retirement, or in the
form of retirement income.
The trend appears to favor non-contributory plans. The fact
that employer contributions to a qualified pension plan are deduc-
tible to the employer, while employee contributions are taxable
as ordinary income to the employee, is a strong factor in the un-
popularity of contributory plans. Apparently organized labor has
taken a strong negative view to contribution by employees. The
fact that during the past several years at least three out of every
19 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a) (5).
20 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a) (4).
21 cf. Rev. Rul. 57-163, part 4(d), 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 128, 140; Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401-1(b) (3), § 1.401-4 (1959).
22 Contributions of over 6% of earnings are permissible; see note 21 supra.
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four plans available for study have been non-contributory indicates
the lack of popularity of the contributory plan.
Care must be taken that an intended non-contributory plan not
be characterized as contributory. A recent case indicated that
where the plan permitted a portion of a contribution to a profit
sharing plan to be withdrawn each year, such portion within the
control of the employee not withdrawn was considered to have
been contributed and thus taxable as current income.23
The effect of self-employed individuals on the trend of such
plans is at present unknown. Pending legislation may tend to
make these plans more attractive, and wider use will crystallize
the importance of such plans in the future.
RETIREMENT POLICY
Retirement age is an important factor in the area of coverage.
The ideal retirement plan should provide for an employee's retire-
ment when his usefulness is so impaired that he is no longer
contributing to the progress of his company. Since this age will
vary within different industries and as applied to various indi-
viduals, any age established would be relatively arbitrary. Social
security legislation pointed to the general acceptance of sixty-five
as a workable limit,2 4 but the lowering of the age of qualification for
social security benefits to sixty-two has apparently had no effect on
private plans. This may be the result of private industry's de-
siring to utilize its experienced personnel as long as possible or,
in some cases, desiring to lower the probability of participation by
the possibility of attrition with advancing age. The latter considera-
tion might be especially true in profit sharing plans.
It is difficult to determine a definite trend toward retirement
or withdrawal from the labor force of personnel because of age.
There has been no distinct separation between management and
labor in the statistical approach to this consideration; consequently
the type of occupation or industry in which the worker is employed
provides a more distinct pattern indicator. Occupations in which
employment has been expanding show continued, if not increased,
employment of aged men,2 5 while those industries which have
stable or decreasing employment have shown reduced employment
of aged personnel. Aged men are concentrated in farming, mana-
23 Hicks v. U.S., 314 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963); Rev. Rul. 63-180, 1963 Int. Rev.
Bull. No. 34, at 7; Rothchild & Ness, "IRS Confines Hicks Case and Sanctions De-
ferred Compensation Choices," 19 J. Taxation 216 (1963).
24 U.S. Dept. of Labor, Private Pension Plans and Manpower Policy 32
(Bulletin No. 1359, 1963).
25 Defined as persons over the age of sixty-five.
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gerial occupations and among the self-employed.26 Unquestionably,
public and private retirement plans have been a contributing factor
to the withdrawal from the labor force of aging workers. The
patterns may be more apparent when the distinction is made be-
tween employers who favor involuntary retirement and those who
favor voluntary retirement.2 7
The employers who favor involuntary retirement usually stress
as reasons for their programs the need to remove aging workers
whose efficiency is decreasing and to open opportunities for pro-
motion of younger men. Employers advocating voluntary retire-
ment stress either the cost of involuntary retirement provisions or
the inappropriateness of age as a criterion for separation. The age
composition of their own work forces and the available labor
supply are probably influential in disposing employers to favor
or oppose involuntary retirement in their firms.28
Union leaders' attitudes toward involuntary retirement are
also conditioned by their unions' specific needs. 29 Although most
leaders usually oppose involuntary retirement in principle, union
leaders in industries suffering heavy unemployment often view
retirement of aged workers as an equitable way to ease the un-
employment problems of their membership. Employer resistance
to shorter working hours as a solution to the problem of unemploy-
ment has aggravated this situation and has led to recently invoked
governmental opposition to overtime pay. When these factors are
coupled with strong union pension or retirement plans, the direc-
tion is obvious.
From the point of general manpower policy, the trend in
employment of aged men will depend upon the level of demand
for labor. In wartime the severe limitation of manpower will induce
a policy of retention of the older worker: when unemployment
attains near normal levels the policy will shift to the opposite pole.
Increased longevity and the so-called "population explosion"
have created dual problems to face the government and have be-
come definite influencing factors in recent years. The high school
drop-out problem has caused an increase in the pressure on the
labor force from the bottom. Although there has been a marked
increase in college attendance, with accompanying delay in entry
26 Supra note 24, at 29. See table at page 32 for occupational breakdowns.
27 Supra note 24, at 35.
28 Supra note 24, at 33. Involuntary retirement may be automatic (required at
a certain age), compulsory (discretionary with management) or flexible (adminis-
tered with great latitude and with attention to the desires of the employees).
20 Bers, Union Policy and the Older Worker 74 (1957).
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into the labor field, this apparently has been insufficient to balance
the increased number of aging workers remaining in the labor force.
There has been continuing, increasing pressure on federal,
state, and local governments to improve the lot of the retired in-
dividual. Medicare and similar programs are constantly being
suggested as partial solutions to the problem of easing the financial
burden of the large segment of the public not covered by private
plans.30 Although there has been an increase in social security and
survivorship benefits, and recent legislation to ease the tax burden
in sale of residences, retirement income credit relief,32 liberalization
of medicine and drug deductions,33 and possible relief in the pro-
visions dealing with care of dependents, 3 4 the pressures still increase.
Despite the efforts to ease the lot of the retired or aged, any
opportunity for employment will usually find willing takers among
those eligible for retirement benefits of one form or another. Sta-
tistics have established that in the professional, technical, mana-
gerial and sales occupations there has been an increase in the
number of aged men employed. 3' There has been in the same
period a corresponding drop in the employment of the aged in
industrial occupations in which self-employment is common, and
this notwithstanding financial opportunity for retirement.
It would be unwise to discount the effect of retirement income
provided by pensions as an incentive for voluntary retirement.
A survey of companies providing varying retirement policies has
indicated that the need for income appears to be the principal
reason for men sixty-four and older desiring to continue work after
age sixty-five. 3 There has been no source of material which would
indicate that plans permitting early retirement have met with gen-
eral employee acceptance. Age sixty-five still appears to me the
earliest acceptable retirement age without the influence of disability
or unemployment.
VESTING PROVISIONS
Vesting provisions are probably the most significant of the
coverage factors. The majority of plans provide that an employee
may retain part or all of his accrued pension credits even though
30 Lesser, "Pension and Other Employee Benefit Plans," in 2 Tax Revision
Compendium, supra note 6, at 1383, 1387.
31 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 121, 6012(c).
32 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 37(a).
33 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 213(b).
34 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 214(a).
35 Kalish, Kellogg & Kessler, "Labor Force and Employment in 1961," 85
Monthly Labor Review 621 (1962).
36 See National Committee on the Aging, Work Attitudes at Age 65, 5 (1959).
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he may terminate his employment before retirement. The extent
of this vested right in the funds differs from plan to plan. Most
plans establish requirements which must be met before the right
to the funds becomes vested in the employee, his heirs or estate.
Usually these requirements are based on either years of service
or an attainment of a specified age together with the completion
of a specific number of years of service. There is no specific
requirement in the Internal Revenue Code that a plan contain
provisions for vesting, other than the requirement that vesting
must occur upon attainment of a normal retirement age.37
Vesting basically is intended to provide the employee with
some assurance that a change of jobs will not result in the loss of
acquired pension benefits. This creates a measure of security by
allowing projection of the value of the acquired rights. The degree
and scale of vesting is usually subject to limitation by the em-
ployer so as not to eliminate entirely a basic purpose of these
plans to the employer - the reduction of turnover.
An employer must determine his turnover rate to enable him-
self properly to establish his plan. This provision is important
because vesting is a distinct item in computing the cost of the plan.
As the most important question to each individual is whether or
not he will in fact get a pension upon retirement, vesting takes on
major importance.38
Effect on Employee Mobility
Because of the degree of employee mobility that has charac-
terized our economy, the requirements of service and age may not
be met by a large number of those currently employed and
participating in the pension plan. The problems to be considered
then are: have deferred vesting requirements limited or deterred
the natural mobility of labor, and further, is such a deterrent desir-
able and acceptable, considering its probable expense to the indi-
vidual worker?
The problem is thus reduced to the conflict between the
desirability of employees obtaining pensions upon retirement and
the desirability of workers feeling free to change jobs. This
problem has brought about a trend in recent years toward a liber-
alization of vesting provisions or at least a creation of schedules
37 Rev. Rul. 57-163, part 5(b) (2), 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 128-1, 147.
38 Professor Dan M. McGill concluded, "Reference to available turnover sta-
tistics suggests that possibly no more than 40 per cent and certainly no more than
50 per cent of employees presently covered under private pension plans will ever
receive a cash benefit from the plan." Pensions: Problems and Trends (McGill ed.
1955).
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where none previously existed. 39 The labor unions have strongly
advocated greater flexibility and employee mobility without loss
of pension rights, and this has resulted in the industry-wide plans
and the geographical multi-employer plans.40 In the area plans,
those which cover all union members within a given geographical
area, termination does not affect the member's participation in
the plan as long as he is employed by a participating employer.
The problems of labor mobility and its effect on the overall
manpower policy of our government have caused sufficient concern
to require careful investigation. In 1961 approximately one-tenth
of the workers employed during that year changed jobs.41 The
volume of such job changes may certainly be considered an indi-
cator of economic conditions. In considering the factors surround-
ing job changes one must examine average employee age, length
of service, occupation and industry in coming to a reliable con-
clusion.
An examination of age as a criterion reveals the largest group
changing jobs in a given year was between the ages of eighteen to
twenty-four. 2 This is understandable, since the younger worker
has little to lose in the way of seniority or pension rights in a job
change; therefore he will change positions until he finds a job which
suits him. The number of jobs left voluntarily by workers decreases
rapidly with age. This fact is one of the most firmly established
findings of the research in this area. Apparently a worker who has
become established with a firm and satisfied with his job considers
the security which accumulated seniority provides, together with
other fringe benefits, sufficiently important to overcome any desire
for a change in jobs. Difficulty in finding adequate employment with
advancing age would also be a contributing factor. This does not
mean that some workers do not retain a degree of mobility through-
out their lives; 43 it must be noted, however, that such workers
customarily hold jobs for periods of short duration.
In establishing any trend in labor mobility it is necessary to
consider the changes in national economic conditions, because the
rate of change appears to be greater during periods of prosperity."
39 Bankers Trust Company, Studies in Industrial Pension Plans (1956 and
1950 editions).
40 Supra note 24, at 5.
41 Supra note 24, at 6.
42 Supra note 24, at 7, table 2.2, "Number of jobs left per 100 persons who
7orked during 1961, by reason for leaving job, age, and sex."
43 Bureau of Old Age and Survivor Insurance, Division of Programs Analysis,
Incidence of Employee Change," (Analytical Note 80, April 18, 1956.)
44 Supra note 24, at 10.
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Employee mobility surveys are generally limited to the manu-
facturing industries because accurate figures can be most readily
obtained in these industries. There appears to be a gradual general
decline in the "quit rate" of employees. It is often explained in
terms of the following influences: growth of unions, development
of seniority provisions, development of fringe benefits (especially
pensions), government and supplementary unemployment benefits,
growth of large corporations, aging of the labor force, and stability
of manufacturing employment. It would be impossible to attribute
the general decline of employee mobility to any one of these
factors. 5 If it were possible to choose the most influential factors,
one would probably have to accept the development of fringe
benefits and aging of the labor force as the most important since
the other forces were prevalent both during World War II and
thereafter, before the decline became marked. Although one hesi-
tates to place primary emphasis on pensions, many writers have
asserted that pensions do reduce mobility independently of other
influences.46 These conclusions have been drawn despite the lack
of data on this subject.
Consideration should be given to the three recent develop-
ments in pension plans which may have had a significant effect
upon the mobility of the employees: first, early vesting has become
more common; second, early retirement and disability retirement
are being provided in an increasing number of plans; and, third,
collective bargaining multi-employer plans are more common.
The number of pension plans containing vesting privileges
has grown from one-fourth of a 300 plan study by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in 1952 to six-tenths in 1958.4' Daniel M. Hol-
land48 pointed out that statistics accumulated by Bankers Trust
Company 49 indicate the increasing liberality of the plans created
in recent years to those workers employed for ten or more years.
45 See Shister, "Labor Mobility: Some Institutional Aspects" in Industrial
Relations Research Association Proceeding (1950); Brissenden, "Labor Mobility
and Employee Benefits," 6 Lab. L.J. 762 (1955).
46 Kerr, "Social and Economic Consequences of the Pension Drive," in Hand.
book on Pensions (National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., Studies in Personal
Policy No. 103, 1950) where the author observes, "Private pension plans, except
where they provide full and immediate vesting of both the employee's and firm's
contribution, retard such movement. They tend to tie the worker to the company
while employed; and hold him in a company-attached labor pool when unemployed
Tilove, op. cit. supra note 9, came to a like conclusion.
47 Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Pension Plans Under Collective Bargaining,'
(Bulletin No. 1259 at 21, 1959).
48 Op. cit. supra note 6.
49 Bankers Trust Company, A Study of Industrial Retirement Plans 14 (1956'
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In the 1958 study, 218 of the 300 plans included provisions
for early retirement. 0 Probably the only noticeable effect of these
provisions is to hold workers approaching the early retirement age
until they have attained this mode of vestingY' In effect it may
only serve to permit older workers to seek lighter work without
actually retiring them from the labor pool. Thus to some degree,
this factor will not, in reality, serve to reduce mobility, but may
even act to stimulate the older semi-retired worker to seek the
change he may have long desired.
The significance of the growth of multi-employer plans is
questionable. These plans usually cover one trade in a number
of localized industries, although in some cases such plans cover
all workers in one industry nationally. No matter what the form
of the plan, one result is to permit a worker to change jobs within
the industry. 2
It can therefore be generally concluded that pension plans
have had no appreciable effect on worker mobility and there is
no indicated trend of limitation of mobility among younger em-
ployees by a promise of future vesting unless such vesting would
occur almost immediately. From an employer's point of view early
vesting would be most desirable in holding down costs if it reduced
employee turnover and reduced costs of training and funding. This
early vesting need not mean vesting of all benefits, but some vesting
would appear to place a premium on retention of employment
without placing an undue restraint on mobility.
AN AGENDA FOR INQUIRY
After considering the various aspects of pension plans, a critical
view for the purpose of suggesting corrections for some short-
comings is appropriate. A selection of some of the major problems
will be discussed.
Corporate Rules on Integration
By the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,53
employee benefits are permitted to be integrated with Social Secur-
ity coverage. By integration the code implies that the amount
of the pension to be given any employee is interrelated with the
50 Supra note 47, at 11.
51 The Internal Revenue Service has ruled that one hundred per cent vesting is
required when employee consent is a requirement for early retirement. Rev. Rul. 57-
163, supra note 21.
52 Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Multi-employer Pension Plans Under Collective
Bargaining," (Bulletin No. 1326, 1962).
53 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(d) (6) (B).
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Social Security payments to be received by the employee upon his
retirement. The only limitation set out in the application of this
principle is that in situations covered by the Self-Employed In-
dividuals Tax Retirement Act of 1962," 4 owner employee contribu-
tions may not exceed one-third of the total contributions. In
practice this will prevent the adoption of an integrated plan by
professional men unless their firm has a sufficient number of part-
ners so that each partner has less than a ten per cent interest.
It would appear that the intent of this provision is to eliminate
the situations in the usual corporate plan in which integration is
used to exclude from benefits any employee earning less than
$4,800 dollars." In situations where this limitation would be onerous,
steps can be taken to circumvent the added cost of this require-
ment, such as operation of the office through another entity, paying
appropriate amounts for services provided, leaving the professional
to individual practice. This possibility is not desirable, but it is
a likely outgrowth of the narrow limits of these plans. The larger
firm is not burdened by this necessity because where the number
of participants exceeds ten, the firm may avail itself of the normal
corporate plan benefits.5 This statutory attempt to limit dis-
crimination is in fact discriminatory. It sets up a completely
different set of rules from those applicable to ordinary corporate
plans. In those plans the provisions of section 401(a)(5) con-
cerning integration with Social Security completely dilute the pro-
visions of section 401(a) (4) against discrimination with respect
to contributions or benefits. The formulas under which the com-
missioner has acquiesced to this form of discrimination have been
set out in Internal Revenue Mimeo, No. 6641. 57 It should be
pointed out that integration is not required by the Code: it is a
requirement added by the Treasury in interpreting the kind of
discrimination that is permissible under the Code.
What would seem to be needed in this area is a complete
revision of this part of the Code, dispensing with classes of plans
and establishing one set of criteria enunciated in the Code and
not in the regulations.
54 76 Stat. 809 (1962).
55 The professional is required to extend the benefits of coverage to his secretary,
receptionist, nurse or other employee who has more than three years service.
56 Adams, "Retirement Plans for Self-Employed Lawyers," 17 Record of
N.Y.C.B.A. 528 (1962); see also Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(d) (5) (A), (B);
404(e) (1) (2).
57 1951-1 Cum. Bull. 41, as modified by Rev. Rul. 61-75, 1961-1 Cum. Bull.
140; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.401-3 (e) (2) (1960).
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The Estate Tax Exclusion
The availability of the estate tax exclusion when distribution
of vested benefits is postponed beyond normal or stated retirement
age deserves investigation. Upon retirement the employee will
often have the option of determining the mode of receipt of his
vested rights. This is done by electing to take all vested benefits
in a lump sum5" or in installments from some source, either the
plan itself or an annuity based on a conversion of rights under the
plan.50
In many instances corporate executives may arrange with
the company to remain active or to defer by other means receipt
of retirement or pension benefits to some date beyond the normal
or stated retirement age in the plan.60 When this occurs and the
employee dies before the vested interests are to be distributed, the
benefits are then distributed directly to a named residual bene-
ficiary without inclusion in the estate of the deceased, thus avoiding
estate taxes.6 This possibility is somewhat avoided in plans for
the self-employed due to the policy of placing a maximum age
of seventy before receipt is required.62
Although this situation is no different from that which exists
in the case of the employee who dies prior to having achieved the
stated or normal retirement age, it does give the surviving em-
ployee a great deal of control over the handling of these funds.
It is, however, not the usual situation: it would not normally be
available to all employees. It would tend to grant a further
benefit to the executive or employee-stockholder who would be
in a position to bargain for such a benefit. This possibility of the
transfer of the retirement program free of estate taxes is of value
in estate planning and in itself is not to be deplored. What is
disturbing is the ability to postpone and avoid these taxes by the
deferment of the vested benefits past the normal or stated age in
the plan, and the fact that such deferment will not be universally
permitted. This again disturbs the equality in the application of
the tax laws.
This situation may be remedied by expansion to cover all
58 Such benefits are taxed at capital gains rates under Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 403 (a) (2).
59 Taxable at ordinary income rates, annuities being taxed under Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 72(a).
60 Permissible under Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5(j), 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 67, 91.
61 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2039(c). This enables the avoidance of the "made
available" provisions of Treas. Reg. § 20.2039-2(b) (3), example 4 (1958) as amended
in T.D. 6526, 1961-1 Cune. Bull. 402, 407.
62 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401 (a) (9) (A).
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persons or a contraction to prevent the deferment where it benefits
only a few. Practical equalization would probably require con-
traction, for few run-of-the-mill employees can afford to postpone
their pensions should they survive beyond the retirement age and
be forced to retire.
Capital Gains Treatment of Multiple Taxpayers
There is a possibility of having the capital gains rate apply
when multiple taxpayers are beneficiaries so as to ameliorate the
income-bunching effect of a lump sum distribution. The primary
benefit of the deferred compensation plans is the deferral of income
tax until the actual receipt of the income.6 The method of pay-
ment chosen by the taxpayer-beneficiary will determine the char-
acter of the tax imposed. In some instances the plan leaves this
determination to the discretion of the trustee 4 with such discretion
being applied to each individual case as it arises.
If the lump sum payment method is chosen, then under section
402 (a) (2) capital gains treatment results. 6 If periodic payments
are made, the annuity rules of section 72 apply and the ordinary
income tax rates are used. 6 Different tax advantages are available
by effective use of these alternative methods.
The installment method may result in a lower total tax even
though ordinary tax rates apply and income-bunching does not
occur. (Bunching is defined as receipt of all income in one taxable
year.) Some taxpayers will be better off to suffer bunching in
order to obtain the benefit of capital gains rates. These possi-
bilities have required that careful consideration be given to the
projection of income over the future years.
There are, however, several ameliorations to the bunching
effect which have been clearly established by the Treasury.67 This
effect can be avoided in some instances where the lump sum dis-
tribution is divided among a number of distributees. As each
distributee is an individual taxpayer, each would receive the
benefits of capital gains treatment provided each one had the
same taxable year. 8 A trust could be created among the bene-
63 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 402 (a) (1), (2).
64 Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5(n), 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 67, 93.
65 Subject to possible limitations established by Internal Revenue Mimeo. No.
5717, 1944-1 Cum. Bull. 321, as modified by Rev. Rul. 60-10, 1961-1 Cum. Bull. 143.
66 See also the provisions of the Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 402(a) (1) and Grayck,
"Taxation of Distributions from Qualified Pension and Profit Sharing Plans," 39
Taxes 34 (1961).
67 Rev. Rul. 62-190, 1962-2 Cum. Bull. 130; Rev. Rul. 292, 1960-2 Cum. Bull. 153.
68 Treas. Reg. § 1A02(a) -1 (a) (6) (iv) (1963).
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ficiaries of the distribution and would be entitled to a lump sum
or capital gain treatment. 69
This situation would seem to be an approved means of circum-
venting the uniform application of the law. It could even be more
classically applied where the taxpayer could effectively be an
employee of numerous corporations over a period of years and
have vested interests in all of them, being able to defer the receipt
of the benefits to a year of his choice and then receive the benefits
in such a manner as to have the receipts taxable in succeeding
years. Although this possibility would seem to be remote, it is a
possible extension of the present Treasury rulings. A multiple
taxpayer method would be effective in the case of a deceased
employee who had been able to allocate his vested rights by
testamentary or inter vivos determination to which the trustee
had acquiesced or agreed to accept in advance.
Plan Termination
The possibility of termination of a benefit oriented plan with-
out restriction on benefits to management employees after ten
years of operation of the plan presents some opportunity for abuse.
The Treasury Department has established the existence of a plan
for a term of ten years as sufficient to negate a presumption of
discrimination in receipts of benefits and the resultant reallocation
among lower-paid employees when a plan is terminated. 70  The
executive group often has the ability to control the progress of
the company or to act in a manner designed to create situations
to avoid characterization of plan termination as discriminatory.71
Where such executive control exists, the distributions on termina-
tion can create benefits to the executive group, generally to the
detriment of the remaining employees and those employees dis-
charged during the period preceding termination. This situation,
in addition to the relative transience of lower paid employees, has
permitted executive groups to reap the greater share of benefits
from pension and profit sharing plans.72 It is especially effective
in closely held corporations.
09 Rev. Rul. 58-423, 1958-2 Cur. Bull. 151.
70 Mimeo 5717, supra note 65.
71 See Bernstein, "Employee Pension Rights When Plants Shut Down: Prob-
lems and Some Proposals," 76 Harv. L. Rev. 952 (1963).
72 Pension plans with past service funding and profit sharing plans with re-
allocation of the forfeitures. The factual situation in Ryan School Retirement Trust,
24 T.C. 127 (1955) is an excellent example. Here the plan at its initiation had five
officers and supervisory employees and one hundred fifteen rank-and-file employees.
Within one year one hundred ten employees had been terminated or transferred.
When the plan was terminated some six years later there were ten employees of
whom five were officers. Only three were rank-and-file employees who had been with
the plan from its inception.
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A basic control against the abuse of termination provisions
would be an affirmative requirement that the company establish
its inability to continue with the plan on a permanent basis. Some
effort has been made to correct the possibility of abuse in the 1962
act 7 by the provision that "upon its termination or upon complete
discontinuance of contributions under the plan, the rights of all
employees to benefits accrued to the date of such discontinuance,
to the extent then funded, or the amounts credited to the em-
ployees' accounts, are non-forfeitable." This section of the Code
was buttressed by regulations. 76  The discharge, on a large scale,
of employees during the winding up of the business is considered to
be a termination.77 The regulations restate that "whether a plan
is terminated is generally a question to be determined with regard
to all the facts and circumstances in a particular case." 78
Basically the Code provides that no portion of the contribu-
tions are to be diverted to the founding corporation's uses. 79 How-
ever, there would be no objection under the Code to funds being
returned to the employer if, upon termination, because of previous
separations there was an excess of moneys above that required to
pay benefits due the remaining covered employees. This excess
would be deemed to arise from erroneous actuarial determinations. 0
Apparently many plans contain a provision permitting such
recoveries. 8'
In the instance where a plan is terminated in its early years
without a complete past service funding, there may be little re-
turned to the employer, the majority of the proceeds going to the
remaining executive group. Such a situation was unsuccessfully
attacked by the Treasury as discrimination.82
A weaker position is found in the area of permanent discon-
tinuance 83 than that which obtains in temporary cessation or
suspension of contributions. The regulations are vague. The sus-
pension rule tends to operate as a test of the ultimate result. To
73 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 346.
74 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 531.
75 See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a) (7).
76 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6 (1963).
77 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(b) (1) (1963).
78 Ibid.
79 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a) (2).
80 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-2(b) (1) (1963).
81 Bernstein, "Tax Regulation of Private Pension Plans: Some Problems and
Proposals," 10 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 808, 819 (1963).
82 Ryan School Case, supra note 72; see the formulas established in Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401-6(c) as to past service funds use.
83 Treas. Reg. § 1.401-6(c) (1) (1963).
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constitute a suspension the plan must fail during any taxable year
to meet the benefit claims upon it and also fail to have on hand
investments, funds or paid-up annuities equal in value to no less
than the interest charges on the original unfunded past service
credit cost. The result is that past funding could be borrowed to
avoid the plan's termination. Thus, during the period of separation
of the employees, no contributions would necessarily have to be
made, provided no prohibited result occurred.
This situation leaves a wide area of possible abuse, especially
in those plans where there is no vesting until retirement or ter-
mination. The present suspension rules are highly inadequate to
protect employees. Perhaps amendment to provide that failure
to make the necessary contribution shall require immediate vesting
in the currently employed persons covered by the plan, at least to
the extent of past contributions on their behalf, would provide
more protection. Such a provision would necessarily require com-
panies to be more cautious in estimating their ability to fulfill the
plan and would prevent the feeling that subsequent weakening of
the company's position would still permit the executives to reap
full benefits. This provision would prove most effective in close
corporation situations.
Such weakness in the area of termination-vesting must be
strengthened in another manner. Permitting low-level funding by
projection of turnover rates or funding for the payment of claims
of the older management group with the subsequent termination
of a plan so as to provide the greater share of funding to this
segment of the employees 84 is a basic weakness which requires
correction. Further, the regulations permit too great an impair-
ment of past service funding by permitting borrowing to avoid
suspension.85
Lump Sum Distributions
The desirability of the use of capital gains treatment to lump
sum distributions raises purposive questions. One question would
be whether distribution of pension funds should be given a capital
gains treatment. The funds invested in the non-contributory
plan are not those of the individual taxpayer. All he has invested
is his time with the company as an employee, for which he has
84 It is this situation within ten years of forming the plan that Mimeo 5717,
supra note 65, attempts to eliminate; but what of termination ten years and one day
later, a possibility within the Board of Directors' ability to control? See also Rev.
Rul. 61-157 part 5(c) (2), 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 67, 88, and Mimeo 5717, 1944-1 Cum.
Bull. 321, as modified by Rev. Rul. 61-10, 1961-1 Cum. Bull. 143, which is incorpor-
ated in Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5(c) (2), 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 67, 88.
85 Treas. Reg. § 1A01-6(c) (1963).
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supposedly been adequately compensated. It may further be
questioned whether the employee would have received greater
compensation directly in the absence of such a deferred compensa-
tion plan. To a great degree the answer would be no; for example,
omission of the negotiated union plans would not necessarily have
meant greater current earnings to beneficiaries. If greater earnings
did result, such earnings in any given year would be negligible. It
is the gross effect of these accumulations with their accompanying
tax free treatment of the income from the investments that is the
factor involved. This is true even in the case of the highly com-
pensated executive. Additional income to a high bracket taxpayer
is of little value. It should be determined as part of this considera-
tion whether the plans are in reality intended to create benefits for
retirement or are simply schemes to defer taxes.
If the intent is to lighten the load during retirement years or
to induce earlier retirement by providing adequate resources to
draw upon, then the concept of lump sum benefit and its accom-
panying capital gains treatment is foreign and should be rejected.
It would appear to be more compatible with such purposes to have
the funds with a trustee or in an annuity rather than in the hands
of the employee, who must reinvest the funds, possibly without the
necessary skill. Since the benefits are intended to supplement
Social Security, they should be received in the same manner and
concurrently with Social Security payments.
This approach was taken in the Self-Employed Retirement
Act."6 The self-employed person is denied the benefits allowed
taxpayers employed by corporations. Although there is a com-
promise of sorts which permits some protection from graduated
tax rates, 7 there is still an inconsistency which borders on dis-
crimination without logical purpose.
Nondiscrimination
The present inconsistent requirements in the Code that cor-
porate plans be nondiscriminatory as to coverage, contributions,
or benefits are coupled with gaping loopholes. The Internal Rev-
enue Code provides certain standards which must be met for quali-
fication of a plan as nondiscriminatory in favor of officers, share-
holders, supervisory and other highly compensated employees. The
plan may not be limited in coverage to such managerial employees,
and the Code provides a statutory formula that would deny quali-
fication if less than fifty-six per cent of "all the employees" 88 par-
86 Supra note 54.
87 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 72(m) (1), (2).
88 As defined by Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a) (3) (A).
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ticipate. Of course the employer may obtain approval without
meeting this coverage requirement if he can prove to the Com-
missioner's satisfaction that the coverage is not in fact discrimi-
natory. 9 Alternatively, the plan must not be discriminatory as to
contributions or benefits. 0 It is not required that botk contribu-
tions and benefits be nondiscriminatory.
The size of contributions or benefits under a qualified plan is
not limited either to a percentage or dollar amount of the portion
of the total or annual contributions that can be allocated for man-
agement employees." All that is required is that the contributions
bear a uniform relationship to the annual compensation of the
employee. 2 This factor is also present to a larger degree in benefit
plans, because managerial employees usually have a longer term of
service than do rank-and-file employees." The only limitation
on these plans is that against early termination."
Further obvious discrimination is found in the ability to inte-
grate the plans with Social Security benefits9 This is attempted
to be justified on the ground that the employer is required to con-
tribute to the plan. 6 Unfortunately this in effect turns what is
normally considered to be a noncontributory plan into a contribu-
tory plan because the employee is required to pay a like amount.97
This situation permits only those employees who earn in excess
of 4,800 dollars to receive the total benefits of a plan. This example
points out the inconsistencies of the Code itself, for it provides the
basic means to circumvent its built-in safeguards.
Postponed Vesting
The present freedom of corporate plans to postpone vesting
until normal or stated retirement age is attained may be regarded
80 Limited as to discrimination in Treas. Reg. § 1.401-4, which now implies that
the matter of disproportionate contributions will be extended beyond the first 10 years
of the plan. It is no longer limited to plans which terminate, but rather places a ceil-
ing upon benefits to any but the highest paid employees which can be raised only
so long as full current costs plus interest on the unfunded liability is met. There is
a question as to the strength of this regulation in light of the thinking in Ryan
School, supra note 72, and Volckening, infra note 91.
90 Id. See also Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a) (4).
01 Volckening, Inc., 13 T.C. 723 (1949), stated that there was no statutory
basis for such a limitation.
92 Goodman, "Permanency as a Requisite of Tax Qualified Pension and Profit
Sharing Plans," 39 Taxes 42, 46 (1961).
93 Cf. Rev. Rul. 60, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 37.
94 Mimeo 5717, supra note 65; Treas. Reg. § 1.4014(c) (1963).
95 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(a) (5).
90 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 3111(2).
97 Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 3101(b).
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as liberty or license. There is no statutory requirement for vesting
the benefits as the Code applies to the usual corporate plan. This
requirement only appears in the self-employed individuals' plans,
and there the requirement is for immediate vesting. 8  The cor-
porate plans may run the gamut from immediate and complete
vesting to no vesting until retirement age is reached. The facts in
each particular case determine whether the vesting provisions are
satisfactory.99 This freedom of the employer to establish vesting
levels at the time the plan is established acts primarily to benefit
those employees who remain with the company for the longest
period of service, especially in the case of profit-sharing plans, 00
and this group is usually the executive or shareholder group.
Union negotiated plans have somewhat overcome this problem
by the use of industry-wide or area plans. Notwithstanding this
major item of progress there is still much to be done to alleviate
the practical inequities implicit in greatly delayed vesting. Statu-
tory change appears to be the only answer.
The Professional Corporation
The effect of the professional corporation upon the area of
deferred compensation has been much debated. The background
of the problem has been the attempt of the Treasury to limit the
relevant court decisions.101 It became apparent that it would be
difficult for any group to meet the criteria outlined by the Treasury
because of existing state laws; participation by an individual was,
of course, impossible. A movement in state legislatures to broaden
possible professional use of deferred compensation plans resulted
in the passage of different forms of legislation. Authorities have
taken opposite positions as to the validity of the legislation."0 2 Until
recently the Treasury has refused to rule on the submitted plans.
98 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 401(d) (2) (A).
99 Treas. Reg. § 1A01-1(b) (1) (i) (1963).
100 See Rev. Rul. 61-157, part 5(d), 1961-2 Cum. Bull. 67, 88, which provides that,
since benefits of profit sharing plans are not determinable, the forfeitures may be
allocated among the remaining participants on a nondiscriminatory basis.
101 U.S. v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954) ; Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to
11 (1960) outline the criteria for approval. See also Lyons, "Comments on the
New Regulations on Associations," 16 Tax L. Rev. 441, 444 (1961).
102-Bittker, "Professional Associations and Federal Income Taxation; Some
Questions and Comments," 17 Tax L. Rev. 1, 28 (1961) takes a negative position.
Grayck, "Professional Associations and the Kitner Regulations: Some Answers,
More Questions and Further Comments," 17 Tax L. Rev. 469 (1962) takes the
opposite position.
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The proposed regulations 103 concerning such plans followed the
expected pattern and are certain to lead to litigation due to the
narrow view taken by the Treasury.
The Treasury's approach has been to limit the extension of the
benefits of deferred compensation rather than to correct the inequi-
ties by limitations of general applicability to participation. It is
true that Congress has not been cooperative in its view of a general
cutback despite the abuses which have grown about the present
statutory operation.
CONCLUSION
The entire area of deferred compensation has become a battle-
field due to inconsistencies of purpose and effect which exist. The
Commissioner has not always been strict in the application of the
Code. Often the apparent softness has been caused by court de-
cisions which the Treasury has been forced to accept. It has been
hoped that the passage of the H. R. 10 legislation would alleviate
the problem to some degree, because the House Reports 104 de-
scribed the legislation as giving "self-employed persons access to
retirement plans on a reasonably similar basis to that accorded
corporate stockholder employees." Instead of this result, the bill
proved a narrow and shadowy image of that which governs the
corporate employee. It is true that the act applies many cor-
rective measures to the self-employed to limit the abuses which
the Treasury desired to be applied to all plans, but the bill went
no further. It is to the credit of the Treasury that most of the
provisions of the current act were proposed by the Treasury at
hearings before the Senate.10 These were intended to affect all
employees who owned ten per cent or more of the voting stock of
a corporation.
It may be felt that the current situation is a step toward
tax reform and that the corporate statutes should be amended
instead of liberalizing the self-employed provisions. 06 It is ob-
103 Proposed Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1, 301.7701-2, 28 Fed. Reg. 13750 (1963)
have even reversed the earlier ruling contained in Letter From John W. S. Littlton,
Director, Tax Ruling Division, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, to Reid and
Riege, Hartford, Connecticut, March 2, 1961, reprinted in P-H Pension and Profit
Sharing f 11,979; see also Grayck, "Tax Qualified Retirement Plans for Professional
Practitioners: A Comparison of the Self-Employed Individual Tax Retirement Act
of 1962 and the Professional Association," 63 Col. L. Rev. 414 (1963).
104 H. R. Rep. No. 139, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1961).
105 Hearings on Pension Plans for Owner-Managers of Corporations Before the
Senate Committee on Finance, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5 (1960).
106 Phillips, "More on H.R. 10," State Bar Bulletin of New Mexico (Jan. 1,
1963).
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vious, however, that the average self-employed individual will
have to attempt to discover means of circumventing the difficult
areas of the bill."' Neither is a satisfactory result. More inves-
tigation of the possibilities of complete revision appears to be
the answer.
107 Hobbet & Donaldson, "H.R. 10; Many Opportunities Exist for Minimizing
Restrictions of New Rules," 17 J. Taxation 339 (1962).
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